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Abstract— Sensor network has a great potential in ap-
plications such as habitat monitoring, wildlife tracking,
building surveillance, and military combat. The design
of a sensor network system involves several important
issues, including the sensing coverage, node-to-node or
node-to-base-station communications, and the security in
information gathering and relay by the sensors. In this
paper, we show that the system performance on these
aspects depends closely on how the sensors are deployed
in the field, and on how the sensor locations can be
adjusted after the initial deployment. For static sensor
deployment, we investigate the hexagon and square lattice
topology and analyze their impact on secure connectivity
and sensing coverage. For advanced sensing devices that
allow for location adjustment after deployment, we have
established a new framework for coordinated updates of
sensor locations. We propose two new sensor location
updating algorithms, the VFSec and the Weighted Cen-
troid algorithm, to jointly optimize sensing coverage and
secure connectivity. Simulation results show that these
new algorithms provide superior tradeoff over the existing
approaches that do not take security into considerations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor network has shown a great potential
in applications such as habitat monitoring, wildlife track-
ing, building surveillance, as well as battlefield surveil-
lance [1], [2]. As these broad applications make sensor
networks a promising technology, the design of sensor
networks is also challenging, especially when one design
aspect is intricately involved with a number of other
aspects [2]. One such example is the the sensor node
deployment. In sensor deployment, there are works con-
cerning the efficient sensing coverage issue [3]–[5], or
the secure communication problem [6], [7], but not both.
Since sensor network systems have inherent complex
criteria and objectives, optimizing a single objective may
impair the system performance on other aspects. As a
first step toward developing the theory and algorithms of
more coordinated sensor deployment, this paper focuses
on jointly considering two important aspects, namely, the
sensing coverage and communication security.
The main jobs for most sensor nodes in a sensor
network include sensing and communications. Depend-
ing on applications, appropriate type of environmental
information in the field are first gathered by the in-
dividual sensor nodes and processed; and the neces-
sary information is then relayed to and/or collected by
other nodes [8], [11]. The physical characteristics of
the sensing and communication devices on board of
a sensor impose limits on both the sensing range and
the communication range. Therefore the placement of
sensor nodes will have great impacts on both the sensing
coverage [3] and the communication connectivity [9].
Recently, the security of sensor networks has been
brought to the attention of the research community [10]
[12]. As the sensor nodes rely on wireless transmis-
sion for communications, malicious adversaries could
intercept the communications, modify the data pack-
ets, or inject falsified packets. To ensure secure sen-
sor communications, cryptographic mechanisms can be
employed to encrypt the data and produce message
authentication code (MAC). As symmetric-key cryptog-
raphy that employ the same cryptographic key in the
sending and receiving ends generally have substantially
lower computational complexity than the public-key
ones, symmetric-key cryptographic tools is generally
preferred in practice because of limited computational
resources at each sensor node. Furthermore, resource-
constrained sensor networks impose stringent constraints
on the key establishment scheme. Conventional key man-
agement schemes are either centralized by employing a
key distribution server, or contributory by using public-
key cryptography, and both often require a non-trivial
amount of communications. These conventional schemes
are not suitable in the sensor network scenarios [13]. To
meet the challenge in designing secure sensor networks,
key pre-distribution schemes have been introduced to
address the special needs in sensor networks [13], [14].
There are two main scenarios that sensor deployment
are modelled and studied, depending on whether the
locations of sensor nodes can be adjusted after the initial
deployment. The first scenario is static deployment,
where the location of the sensors will not change once
deployed. When efficient sensing coverage is the sole
concern, the existing literature suggests that different
deployment topologies lead to substantially different effi-
ciency in sensing coverage [15], [16]. In the mean time,
researchers focusing on secure sensor communications
have recently shown that, if the key pre-distribution
can be adapted according to the sensors’ locations, we
can substantially improve the probability for establishing
secure communication links between sensors as well as
the security against compromised nodes [6], [7], [26].
However, there is a very limited amount of analysis
on how the topology of sensor locations affects both
security and coverage issues. In Section III of this paper,
we present analytic model and experimental validations
on several practical topologies in terms of both sensing
coverage and ability to establish secure communication
links. We shall consider both the case when each sensor
can be accurately placed at any desired location, and
the case when the actual deployment deviates from the
desired location. This investigation will provide impor-
tant guidelines to sensor deployment for a variety of
applications.
The second scenario of sensor deployment consid-
ers more advanced sensing devices, where the sensors
have the capability of adjusting their locations after
being deployed in the field. This is particularly useful
when the actual deployment deviates from the desired
location. The current literature primarily concerns the
development of adjustment algorithms to optimize the
sensing coverage. As we shall show in Section IV,
such adjustment may negatively affect the probability
for sensors to establish secure communication links. This
motivates us to develop new adjustment algorithms that
can jointly optimize the sensing coverage and commu-
nication security. We further relate to the first scenario
by examining how different topologies for the desired
deployment locations affects the overall performance
under these security-aware adjustment algorithms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the background and the prior works related
to sensor network deployment. In Section III we jointly
investigate the sensing coverage and communication
security under the static sensor deployment scenario. We
then consider the mobile scenario where sensors can
adjust their locations after being deployed and propose
two new location-adjusting algorithms in Section IV,
by jointly considering the sensing coverage and secure
communications. Finally, the conclusions are drawn in
Section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
In this section, we review the background on sensing
coverage and secure communications in sensor networks,
and briefly survey the related prior works. Throughout
the discussion we adopt a simplified mathematical model
for sensing coverage. A sensor node located at x0 has
the capability S of sensing for a given location x
S(x0,x) =
{
1 if d(x0,x) ≤ Rs;
0 if d(x0,x) > Rs.
(1)
where Rs is referred to as the sensing radius, and the
distance metric d(·, ·) is usually the Euclidean distance.
S = 1 indicates the sensor has the capability to sense and
S = 0 otherwise. Analogous to the sensing capability,
we can simplify the existence of a communication link
between two sensor nodes n0 (located at x0) and n1
(located at x1) using the following model
T (x0,x1) =
{
1 if d(x0,x1) ≤ Rc;
0 if d(x0,x1) > Rc.
(2)
where Rc is referred to as the communication radius.
T = 1 indicates the link exists and T = 0 otherwise.
A. The Sensing Coverage Problem
1) Efficient Sensing in Static Deployment: Suppose
the sensor nodes with sensing radius Rs can be hand
placed in the field to the exact location of our choice.
We are interested in the optimal way to place the sensors
so that: (1) any location in the field can be covered by at
least one sensor; and (2) the nodes can perform sensing
in an efficient way. To quantify the efficiency of sensing
coverage, we define the sensing efficiency ratio ρ, which





Here Acol is the actual covered area by all the sensor
nodes, and Asep is the sum of the area covered by each
individual sensor. Apparently, we have Asep ≥ Acol as
the coverage between sensors may overlap, thus ρ ≥ 1.
The closer the efficiency ratio gets to 1, the higher the
efficiency. So the problem of optimizing coverage effi-
ciency can be formulated as to minimize the efficiency
coefficient ρ subject to the whole area can be fully
covered. This problem is traditionally known as the circle
covering problem [18], where a number of equivalent
circles (i.e. circles with the same radius) are placed into
a field to completely cover the field area. A sensor node
is located at the center of a circle, and the radius of the
circle corresponds to the sensing radius.
If the circles are placed in repeated regular patterns,
the circle centers form a lattice and the dissecting lines
among the centers form a cell pattern. In Fig. 1 we show
two possible covering layout using the square lattice
and the hexagon lattice, respectively. Each layout leads
to a specific efficiency ratio ρ, which is also known
as the covering density or covering thickness in the
mathematics literatures [16]. For the simplified sensing
model of Eqn. (1), Asep = n · πR2s , where n is the
total number of sensors. Kershner [15] has shown that a
lower bound for ρ is 2π/
√
27 ≈ 1.21, which is achieved
when the center of the circles (i.e. the sensor nodes)
form a hexagon lattice. In this case, the distance between
any two neighboring nodes is D =
√
3Rs. Fig. 1(b)
illustrates the geometry of such a placement. Compared
to the square lattice placement, which has efficiency ratio
ρ = π/2, the hexagon lattice placement gives much
more efficient coverage. Further, sensor placement can
be viewed as spatial sampling from signal processing
perspective. The literature there also suggests the su-
periority of hexagonal sampling lattice over the square
lattice when the spatial spectrum of a 2-D signal being
measured (such as a temperature field) is bandlimited
with a circular support.
For the convenience of discussion, we define the
following notations. In the square lattice deployment, we
denote the distance from a node to its horizontal/vertical
neighbor by D1, and the distance to its diagonal neighbor
by D2. Thus we have D2 =
√
2D1 ≈ 1.41D1, and
the covering density ρ = πR2s/D
2
1. In the hexagon
lattice, we denote the distance from a node to its six
neighbors by D3. Further, if we require that the two
lattice have the same node density, we have D3 =√
2/
√
3D1 ≈ 1.07D1. Throughout this paper, we will
use the normalized distance with respect to D1 as the
distance metric, and study the impact of deployment
topology on the performance of sensing coverage and
secure communications.
2) Sensor Location Adjustment Algorithms: In recent
years, the advances in micro-electromechanical systems
(MEMS) have made it possible for tiny sensor devices
to walk as microrobots [22]. The locomotion capabilities
of sensor nodes have made it possible to improve the
sensing coverage after the initial sensor deployment.










(a) The square lattice.












(b) The hexagon lattice.
Fig. 1. Two possible lattice deployment. Under full coverage
requirement, the hexagon lattice has the lowest node density.
Consequently, a number of prior works have studied how
to adjust the location of sensor nodes to maximize the
total coverage in a given area [3]–[5], [17], [21]. The
total sensing coverage, η, is the percentage of the area
covered within the sensing range with respect to the total
field area. We can see that η ≤ 1 and a larger η represent
a better coverage. Most existing algorithms for sensor
location adjustment uses an iterative framework. In each
iteration, sensors (or a cluster head) obtain their current
locations and the relative locations to their neighbors.
Based on these information, each node will compute
a new location using the location updating algorithm.
The general strategy is to spread out the sensor nodes
as evenly as possible. For example, the virtual force
algorithm (VFA) proposed in [5] compares the distance
between a sensor and its neighbor nodes with a threshold
distance. An attractive (resp. repulsive) virtual force is
applied to the sensor node if the distance is greater
(resp. smaller) than the threshold. The Minmax algorithm
proposed in [4] employs the Voronoi cell concept and
move the sensors to the center of the minimum-radius
circum-circle of its Voronoi. Further, for calculating
the sensing coverage, the authors of [3] and [17] have
proposed polynomial-time algorithms to calculate the
worst case and average case coverage.
From secure communication point of view, however,
the location adjustment intended only to maximize sens-
ing coverage may reduce the secure communication
connectivity. This is because the secure links established
before location adjustment may no longer exist after lo-
cation adjustment and some sensor nodes can be moved
to un-preferred locations in terms of establishing secure
communications using pre-distributed key. In Section IV,
we will present a detailed example to illustrate the
limitation of the existing adjustment methods and discuss
how to balance the tradeoff between the sensing coverage
and the node connectivity using secure links.
B. Key Pre-distribution for Sensor Networks
As reviewed earlier, one of the critical issues for
secure sensor communication is to establish a cryp-
tographic key between two sensors. To accommodate
stringent resource constraints in sensor network systems,
an increasingly popular approach is to preload each
sensor with a set of keys from a large collection of keys.
This entire collection of keys is referred to as the key pool
and the set of the keys loaded by each sensor is referred
to as the key ring. Once the sensors are deployed in the
field, neighboring sensors will follow certain protocol
to discover whether they share some secret keys. If so,
they will use these shared secret keys to establish a
secure communication link. There are two requirements
for establishing a secure communication link between
two sensor nodes: (1) two nodes should be within
communication range; and (2) two nodes should share at
least one secret key. The first work on random key pre-
distribution [13] was proposed by considering the sensor
nodes are randomly deployed into the field. As such, the
connectivity between nodes using secure links can be
modelled as a random graph, and the number of secure
links per node can be obtained using a probabilistic
model. This will lead to node connectivity using the
random graph theory [13]. Later, Du et al. and Liu et
al. proposed to incorporate sensor location knowledge
into key pre-distribution [6] [7]. The deployment model
in these works considers the sensors being deployed at
the center of evenly partitioned square cells. Each cell
will have its own key pool, and only neighboring cells
will have overlap between their key pools. The sensors in
each cell will randomly pre-load keys from the key pool
of its own cell. Since the key pool of each cell is much
smaller compared to the key pool for the entire sensor
node collection, neighboring sensors will have a higher
chance to share keys. Most recently, Zhou et al. identify
the improved circular symmetry of the hexagon cell than
the square one to reflect the common shape of sensors’
communication range, and propose to use hexagon lattice
in location-based key pre-distribution [26].
In location-based key pre-distribution, each sensor has
a designed deployment location for establishing secure
communication link. In practice, these designed locations
may not be the same as the locations determined ac-
cording to the sensing performance. This motivates us
to study the impact of practical sensor deployment on
establishing secure communications.
III. STATIC SENSOR DEPLOYMENT WITH
LATTICE STRUCTURE
In this section, we jointly examine the sensing cover-
age and communication security under the static sensor
deployment scenario. Given that a very limited amount
of study has been done in the literature on how the sensor
topology affects both security and coverage issues, we
focus on analyzing the impact of deployment topology
on the performance of sensing coverage and efficiency as
well as to the ability of establishing secure communica-
tions. We will consider two main deployment topologies,
namely, the square lattice and the hexagon lattice.
A. Fundamental Relations Between Deployment Lattices
As the first example to illustrate the impact of sensor
deployment topology on the establishment of secure
communications links, we consider the simple case of
sensors being placed exactly at the desired location. We
deploy sensors under a square lattice and a hexagon
lattice, respectively, and employ the basic key pre-
distribution scheme [13], where each node has the same
probability to share a secret key with any other node. We
denote the key sharing probability by Pshare, and use the
same node densities in the two lattice deployment, which
is the number of nodes per unit area. As the communica-
tion radius Rc increases from 0 to 1.6D1, each sensor can
gradually have more reachable neighbors, and this in turn
will affect the number of secure links per node. Because
the distance between a node and its eight neighboring
nodes in a square lattice is not circularly symmetric [26],
the number of neighbor nodes that can be reached is a
two-step function of the communication range. That is,
as the communication range increases, four vertical and
horizontal neighbors of the center nodes (also known as
the 4-way connection [27]) will be reached first, before
the other four neighbors on the diagonal directions being
reached. This can be seen from Fig. 2, where we show
the relation of the expected number of secure links per

















expected number of secure links versus communication radius
square lattice
hexagon lattice
Fig. 2. Expected number of secure links versus communication
radius using the basic key pre-distribution scheme.
node, normalized by the key sharing probability, with
respect to the normalized communication radius. The
result for a hexagonal lattice, on the other hand, is a one-
step function, owing to the circular symmetry between
a center node and its six neighbors. Under the same
node density, Fig. 2 shows that hexagon lattice achieves
a better topology when the communication radius Rc
is between 1.07 and 1.41 times of D1; and outside
this range, square lattice achieves a better connectivity.
Later in this paper, we shall see several more examples
reflecting this fundamental relations between the square
and hexagon deployment lattice.
In addition to the ability to establish secure links
between nodes, resilience against node compromise is
another important security aspect to be examined. As
sensor nodes may be deployed in adversarial environ-
ment, a deployed node could be captured by adversaries.
Using pre-loaded keys in the captured node, an adversary
can potentially eavesdrop secure links among sensor
nodes that are not compromised. In measuring such a
potential threat, the probability of link compromise due
to node compromise is an important security metric
considered by previous key pre-distribution works [6],
[13], [14], [25]. To allow fair comparison on different
deployment topologies, we should require each topology
to have the same link compromise probability when
the same number of nodes are compromised, and then
compare the connectivity of secure communication. We
have constructed a probabilistic model to compute and
approximate the link compromise probability in the
location-based key pre-distribution scheme [6] using lat-
tice deployment. It can be shown that if the compromised
nodes are statistically uniformly distributed among all
nodes and each node carries the same number of keys,
then the link compromise probability is approximately
the same for the location-based scheme using the square
lattice, the hexagon lattice, and the basic scheme using
random deployment, up to the first-order Taylor expan-
sion [13]. The detailed derivation can be found in the
Appendix. With this finding, we can construct a fair
comparison between deployment topologies. As we shall
see later, for fixed-size key ring, the group-based scheme
using structured/lattice deployment usually can achieve
a better connectivity than the random deployment.
B. Secure Connectivity Under Perturbed Deployment
Lattice
While Fig. 2 depicts the trend for the secure commu-
nication connectivity using square and hexagon lattices
in the ideal situation, sensors may not be deployed with
high accuracy at the designed lattice locations in practice.
Such inaccuracy may be caused by measurement error (if
sensors are deployed by human), or by wind speed (if
sensors are deployed by vehicle or airborne methods).
Suppose a sensor node is designed to be deployed at
location (x0, y0) in the field. The actual deployment
location (x, y) can be modelled as
x = x0 + rx; y = y0 + ry.
Here the deviation terms rx and ry are zero-mean
random variables. One can model these deviation terms
as Gaussian distributed [6] or uniformly distributed [25]
random variables with variance σ2 as the deviation
parameter.
Taking the deployment deviation into consideration,
we investigate the impact of deployment topology on the
connectivity of secure communication. Here we choose
the location-based key pre-distribution in [6] and the
Gaussian deployment deviation model and compare the
square lattice deployment used in [6] with the hexagon
lattice deployment. In the hexagon lattice deployment,
each node is surrounded by six neighbor nodes. By using
location-based key pre-distribution, the key pool for any
given node, referred to as the center node, has 1/6
overlap with each of its six neighbors’ key pools. Thus
the the center node will have equal probability to share
keys with each neighbor node. We denote the probability
that the center node can still be a neighbor with one of its
neighbor node under Gaussian deployment deviation by
Pr(neighbor), and the probability that the two nodes can
share a key by Pr(share). As the deployment deviation
is independent of key distribution, the probability that a
designed neighbor in the hexagon lattice can establish
a secure link with the center node is Pr(hexlink) =
Pr(neighbor) Pr(share). Because of the geometrical
symmetry, the expected number of secure links for the
center node is
E(Nhexsec ) = 6Pr(hexlink).
Similarly, we can compute expected number of secure
links per node in the square lattice deployment. In the
square lattice, we refer to the horizontal/vertical neigh-
bors of a node as type-A neighbors and the diagonal
neighbors as type-B neighbors. Denote the probability
that a node can establish a secure link with one of its
type-A neighbors as Pr(sqlinkA), and that with type-
B neighbors as Pr(sqlinkB). The expected number of
secure links per node is
E(N sqsec) = 4 Pr(sqlinkA) + 4 Pr(sqlinkB).
In Fig. 3 we show the expected number of secure
links per node under Gaussian deployment deviation.
Each node carries 100 keys and each key pool contains
1200 keys. The neighbor probability and key sharing
probability can be computed using the model in [24]. In
Fig. 3, in both square and hexagon lattice deployment,
the expected number of secure links increases with the
normalized communication radius Rc/D1. The hexagon
lattice achieves a slightly higher connectivity over the
range of 0.9 and 1.7 in the normalized communication
radius, exhibiting a similar trend as in Fig. 2. This
suggests that the communication radius, deployment
topology, deviation parameter, and the number of pre-
loaded keys per sensor all play a role in establishing
secure links. It is also worth noticing that while the
numerical gain in connectivity by hexagon lattice over
the above mentioned communication range is small, its
practical impact is non-trivial. Within this communica-
tion range, the average node degree increases from 0.5 to
around 4, and the sensors gradually change from isolated
nodes to connected components, where the boundary
value for the average links per node is around 2. This
phenomenon will be illustrated later in Section IV. To
achieve the same connectivity, the square lattice would
require a larger communication range. As the power
consumption of wireless communications is related to
the communication range by a power law (from the 2nd
to the 4-th power, depending on the propagation envi-
ronment [19]), a lower requirement on communication
range with lower power consumption while maintaining
communication connectivity is more desirable in many
sensor network designs. This makes hexagon deployment
lattice attractive for power-limited applications.























Fig. 3. Expected number of secure links per node versus commu-
nication radius. Shown here are the analytical values under Gaussian
deployment deviations.
IV. SECURITY-AWARE SENSOR LOCATION
ADJUSTMENT
The static deployment strategy described in the pre-
vious section considers the sensor deployment as a
one-time task. Once the sensors are deployed in the
field, their locations are fixed and cannot be further
adjusted. In recent years, a number of works on practical
sensor deployment have considered movement-adjusted
sensor deployment for improving sensing coverage [4],
[5], [21]. In this section, we investigate the impact
of location adjustment in sensor deployment on secure
communications. We propose two new location updating
algorithms for sensor deployment that jointly consider
sensing coverage and secure communications.
A. Improving Secure Connectivity Using the Virtual
Force Framework
1) Effect on Secure Connectivity by the Existing Ap-
proach: When secure communications is required for
sensor nodes, the existing location adjustment algo-
rithms may negatively affect the establishment of secure
communication links. As an example, we examine the
establishment of secure communication links when the
sensors are moved by the Virtual Force [5] location
updating algorithm. The Virtual Force algorithm adjusts
the sensor locations based on the relative distance from
a sensor to its neighbors compared to a pre-determined
threshold dth. Suppose a node ni has a neighbor node
nj and their distance is dij . The virtual force applied by








Coverage ratio ρ = 0.7; Average secure links per node N
sec
 = 2.5
(a) Initial deployment locations








Coverage ratio ρ = 0.85; Average secure links per node N
sec
 = 1.6
(b) Locations after 4 VFA iterations
Fig. 4. Impact of location adjustment to the establishment of secure links using VFA




wA(dij − dth) · −→v ij if dij ≥ dth;
(wR/dij) · −→v ji dij < dth. (3)
Here −→v ij is the unit-length pointing from the location of
ni to that of nj . The total virtual force
−→
F i on ni is the






F ij . (4)
After computing the virtual force for each node, the node
ni is moved to the direction specified by the aggregated
virtual force
−→
F i with a step size equal to its magnitude
|−→F i|.
Fig. 4 shows an example of location updating using the
VFA and its impact on secure communications. Initially,
49 sensors are deployed into a 60 × 60 area with a
hexagon lattice pattern. A uniform distributed deploy-
ment deviation is applied to the initial locations, with the
deployment variance σ2 = 4/3. This initial deployment
is shown in Fig. 4(a) with the established secure links
marked as lines connecting the sensor nodes. In this
example, the sensing radius is 5 and the communication
radius is 9. The sensing coverage achieved by the initial
deployment is η = 0.7 and the average number of secure
links per node is Nsec = 2.5. Next, we apply the VFA
to update the sensor locations. After four iterations, the
sensing coverage has been improved to η = 0.85, while
Nsec has been reduced significantly to Nsec = 1.6,
implying most of the nodes are no longer connected. This
is illustrated in Fig. 4(b). At the initial deployment, most
nodes form a connected component using the secure
links; after four iterations, about half of the nodes are
no longer connected with the largest connected group,
which reduces the capability of secure communications
between the sensor nodes. Our study shows that such a
phenomenon is common in sensor location update using
virtual force type of schemes. To maintain a comparable
sensing coverage while improving secure connectivity,
we propose a modified sensor location updating algo-
rithm based on the virtual force framework. We call
the modified algorithm VFSec, indicating that secure
communications is one of the main factors in updating
the sensor locations.
2) VFSec Algorithm: As we have seen, there is
a tradeoff between the sensing coverage and secure
connectivity. For balancing this tradeoff, we define an
additional performance metric as
Γ = w1η + w2Nsec. (5)
The weights w1 and w2 are chosen such that w1η and
w2Nsec are approximately in the same value range, so as
to achieve a desired tradeoff. Since the sensing coverage
is always within [0, 1], and the average number of secure
links per node is around 3 in most of our experiments,
we choose w1 = 1 and w2 = 1/3 in our experiments.
Our algorithm uses the combined performance metric
Γ to measure the optimality of sensor locations, which
balances the tradeoff between coverage and secure com-
munications. During each iteration of location adjust-
ment, the algorithm tries to keep the distance between
those nodes that can establish secure links closer. To
achieve this, we add a new term of virtual force,
−→
F sec,
to the total virtual force. The virtual force
−→
F secij applied





ws(dij − Dsec) · −→v ij if Dsec < dij < Rc





F secij , Dsec is a threshold distance smaller
than the communication radius Rc, dij is the distance
between node ni and nj , ws is the weight assigned to
the added virtual force, and −→v ij is the unit-length vector
pointing from the location of ni to that of nj . The total





F secij . This force is added to distance-based forces−→
F ij in Eqn.(4) to compute the total virtual force
−→
F i. To
update the sensor location, the sensor node ni is moved
along the direction of
−→
F i by a distance equal to the
magnitude of vector |−→F i|. The complete algorithm is
described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 VFSec algorithm
Input: sensor locations {(xi, yi)}ni=1 and key index
set {Ki}ni=1
Output: new locations (xopt1 , y
opt










i ) ←− (xi, yi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
/* Iteration */
for i = 1 to MAX-ITERATION do
for each sensor node ni do
Calculate
−→
F ij using the formulation in [5]
Calculate
−→








(x′1, y′1) ←− (xi + Fix, yi + Fiy) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Compute Γ using Eqn.(5) with
({(x′i, y′i)}ni=1, {Ki}ni=1)
if Γ > Γopt then
(xopti , y
opt
i ) ←− (x′i, y′i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
end if
end for
3) Simulation Results and Discussions: To study
the performance of VFSec, we have performed three
experiments and compared the VFA and VFSec in
terms of sensing coverage and secure link establishment.
Throughout these experiments, we set the communica-
tion radius Rc as twice the sensing radius Rs. This is to
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Fig. 5. Comparison of VFA and VFSec with uniform random initial
deployment.
ensure that even when the sensing range is very small
and two neighboring sensors are barely disjointly placed
(i.e. the distance between two neighboring sensor nodes
is 2Rs), it is still possible to establish a communication
link between the two sensors. In all the experiments,
both the VFA and VFSec algorithms are run for seven
iterations.
In the first experiment, we place 36 sensors nodes
uniformly in a 50 × 50 area. Using VFA and VFSec,
the locations of the sensors are adjusted. The sensing
coverage and the number of secure links per node are
recorded. We repeat such experiment 400 times and
computed the average coverage and the number of secure
links per node under different sensing and communica-
tion radius. From the results shown in Fig. 5 we can















































Fig. 6. Comparison of VFA and VFSec using square deployment
lattice under Gaussian deployment deviation.
see that, the proposed VFSec algorithm can improve the
average number of secure links by approximately 15-
20%, with a small reduction in the sensing coverage by
approximately 2-5%. In addition, the VFSec consistently
achieves a better performance in terms of the overall
performance metric Γ in Eqn.(5).
In the second experiment, we compare the VFSec and
VFA using square lattice deployment under Gaussian
deployment deviation. We fix the node density and the
deviation parameter σ = 0.4D1. From Fig. 6, we can see
that VFSec improves the average number of secure links
per node, with a small compromise in the sensing cover-
age. In this experiment, we have excluded the boundary
nodes of the square deployment area in computing the
sensing coverage and number of secure links. Thus the
results can be viewed as if the performance is evaluated
in an infinitely large area. In spite of the difference in
accounting the performance, the results in Fig. 6 shows
the same trend as in Fig. 5.
In the third experiment, we compare the square and
hexagon lattice deployment using the corresponding
location-based key pre-distribution. We use the proposed
VFSec algorithm for location updating and the results















































Fig. 7. Comparison of deployment lattice using VFSec under
Gaussian deployment deviation.
are obtained for different communication and sensing
radius under small deployment deviation (σ/D1 = 0.2).
Fig. 7 shows that the hexagon and square lattices achieve
comparable sensing coverage. In terms of the average
number of secure links per node, the hexagon lattice
achieves a better performance when the normalized com-
munication radius Rc/D1 is in the approximate range of
[1, 1.5]; outside this range, the square lattice performs
better. Such a result again shows that there is no all-
time winner in terms of deployment lattice, as is shown
in the step function connectivity graph in Fig. 2 for the
ideal hexagon and square lattices. When designing secure
sensor networks, the deployment lattice as well as system
parameters, such as the communication radius, should be
taken into consideration.
4) Implementation Issues: Similar to the VFA algo-
rithm, the VFSec can be performed by the cluster head
of the sensor nodes. As the cluster head is equipped with
better computing resource, it would save the computing
power of each individual sensors. Further, as indicated in
Algorithm 1, the iterations for updating sensor locations
can be performed by the cluster head and only the
final results obtained are sent back to the sensor nodes.
Therefore the actual location adjustment is performed
only once by each sensor. To run the VFSec algorithm,
the cluster head needs to collect the sensors’ key index
sets and their current locations. The key indices are ID’s
assigned to secret keys, which is used in the shared
key discovery phase in key pre-distribution schemes [13]
[14].
The advantage of using a cluster head to implement
the location updating algorithm is that the power con-
sumption of individual sensors can be reduced. When
the cluster head is not available, the algorithm can
be performed by the individual sensors only based on
its neighborhood information. When the VFSec is per-
formed by individual sensors, Algorithm 1 must be ad-
justed to better suit the distributed implementation. The
sensors need to perform movement adjustment after each
iteration. At the same time, computing and comparing
the global performance metric Γopt as in Algorithm 1
would not be feasible; and the number of iterations must
be limited to reduce the power consumption in sensor
movement.
B. Sensor Location Adjustment Based on Vector Quan-
tization
One limitation of the VFSec algorithm is that in
order to achieve a better secure connectivity, the sensing
coverage is somewhat sacrificed. The reason is that the
virtual force based approach simplifies the problem in a
two-dimensional area to a set of vectors. In this part, we
propose a new approach for updating sensor locations
that can explore more freedom in the two-dimensional
space to jointly optimize sensing coverage and secure
communications.
The problem of covering a region using distributed
sensor nodes is analogous to the vector quantization
problem in signal compression [23]. In the sensing
coverage problem, each node can sense its nearby region
with certain accuracy. The goal is to maximize the total
coverage given a limited number of sensors. In the
quantization problem, each point in the k-dimensional
space is associated with a representative point in the
codebook. The goal is to use a limited number of points
to represent all points in the region with minimum
error. In two-dimensional space, if the input signal is
statistically uniformly distributed, the minimum-error
quantization lattice and the most efficient covering lattice
are the same hexagon lattice [16] as we have seen in
Fig. 1(b). This has motivated us to employ insights in
the vector quantization literature to explore solutions for
sensor deployment.
1) The Weighted Centroid Algorithm: Several prior
works have proposed location updating algorithms that
are similar to the two-dimensional vector quantization
solution [3] [4]. In particular, the MinMax algorithm
proposed in [4] computes the Voronoi cell V for each
sensor node n, and move the sensor to the minmax
location xminmax so that the maximum distance from
the new location to any point in the cell V is minimized,
i.e.,





It has been shown in [4] that the minmax location is
the center of the minimum-radius circum-circle of the
Voronoi cell associated with each node.
Inspired by these works, we propose a new approach
for updating sensor locations based on the Lloyd-Max
quantization algorithm [23]. We consider that the sen-
sor has a communication range Rc and can know the
locations of its neighbors and its own location [3]. Fur-
thermore, the proposed approach will allow the sensors
to take secure communication as a factor in updating
locations.
Our proposed algorithm aims at minimizing the
weighted average distance of a sensor node to the points
in its Voronoi cell. We choose a weighted square distance
as the distance metric. Suppose in the two-dimensional
space, there are N points uniformly distributed at loca-
tions {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 inside the Voronoi cell formed of a
sensor node located at (x0, y0) and its neighbors. Each
point is associated with a weight wi. Then the weighted






wi[(x0 − xi)2 + (y0 − yi)2]. (7)
From the classic vector quantization results [23], we
know that given the set of points {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 and
the weight {wi}Ni=1, the optimal value for (x0, y0) that










For the dual problem, we know directly from the defini-
tion of Voronoi cell that, for any point p located inside a
voronoi cell Vi of sensor ni, the node ni is closer to the
point p than any other node outside the Voronoi cell Vi.
Thus we have naturally obtained an iterative algorithm
for location updating.
The proposed algorithm works as follows. In each
iteration, each sensor ni discovers its neighbors and
generates its Voronoi cell Vi according to the neighbor
locations. Next, the sensor node generates a set of
uniformly distributed grid points {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 inside Vi
and assign weight to each point. Then the node will
compute its new location (x′0, y′0) that can minimize the
weighted square distance Dw according to Eqn.(8). The
simplest weight assignment is to assign equal weight of
one to all points. When different weights are assigned
to the sampling grid points, the solution (xopt0 , y
opt
0 ) is
the centroid of the Voronoi cell with respect to weight
assignment {wi}. Therefore we refer to the algorithm as
the weighted centroid (WTC) algorithm and describe it
in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 The Weighted Centroid Algorithm
Input: sensor location (x0, y0), neighbor locations
{(xi, yi)}Nbi=1
Output: movement vector v
Compute Voronoi cell V
Generate uniform grid points {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 ∈ V
Assign weight {wi}Ni=1 using Alg. 3
Compute updated location (x′0, y′0) using (8)
Compute the movement vector v ←− [(x′0, y′0) −
(x0, y0)]
/* adjustment for stability */
if |v| > Rs/2 then
v ←− Rsv/(2|v|)
end if
Algorithm 3 The Weight Assignment Procedure
Input: neighbor locations {xi}Nbi=1, sampling points
{pi}Ni=1, Rc, and wsec
Output: weight vector {wi}Ni=1
wi ←− 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ N
for i = 1 to Nb do
for j = 1 to N do
if Sec(ni, nc) and 0.7Rc ≤ d(xi,pj) ≤ 0.95Rc
then




To jointly consider secure communication and sensing
coverage, we propose the following weight assignment
procedure. For each sensor node ni, after the Voronoi
cell has been formed and the grid points are generated,
the base weight for each grid point inside the cell is
























Fig. 8. Illustration of the weight assignment in the weighted centroid
algorithm.
1. If the node ni already has a secure link with a
neighbor node nj , each grid point that falls into the ring
area centered at nj , and between the radius 0.7Rc and
0.95Rc will be assigned an extra weight of wsec = 0.5.
An algorithmic description of the weight assignment
procedure is presented in Algorithm 3. In Algorithm 3,
Nb refers to the number of neighbors of a center node
nc; and the function Sec(ni, nj) is an indicator function,
which returns true if node ni and nj has a secure
communication link and false otherwise.
In Fig. 8 we illustrate the weight assignment proce-
dure. In this figure, the center node is shown as a square,
its neighbor nodes are shown as circles, and the node
that already has a secure link with the center node is
shown as a plus sign. The Voronoi cell is shown as the
shaded area. The grid points are shown either as cross
or as dots, where a dot indicates that grid point is inside
the ring area between radius 0.7Rc and 0.95Rc of its
secure communication neighbor. The weighted centroid
is shown as a diamond in Fig. 8. We can see that the
updated location is within the center of the ring area, at
the same time tends to cover more areas in the Voronoi
cell.
The choice of the ring area to be within
[0.7Rc, 0.95Rc] is due to the joint consideration
of sensing and communications. When the center node
is far away from its neighbor, the ring-based weighting
tend to pull the center node towards its neighbor.
When the center node is too close to its neighbor,



































Fig. 9. Comparison of the weighted centroid and minmax algorithm,
small Gaussian deployment deviation, hexagon lattice deployment
and location-based key pre-distribution.
the ring-based weighting tend to push the center node
away from its neighbor. Thus this weight assignment
maintains the communication connectivity between the
center node and its neighbors, at the same time avoids
too much wasteful overlaps between their sensing
regions.
2) Simulation Results and Discussions: We study the
performance of the weighted centroid (WTC) algorithm
using several experiments. We compare it with the
performance of the MinMax algorithm proposed in [4],
which is known as one of the best schemes in sensor
location updating for improving sensing coverage.
In Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 we compare the sensing cov-
erage ratio and the average number of secure links
per node achieved by the proposed WTC algorithm
and by MinMax, with respect to the normalized sens-
ing/communication radius. We set communication radius
Rc = 2Rs. The initial deployment uses hexagon lattice
and the key pre-distribution uses location-based scheme.
Each node has preloaded 100 keys. Both algorithms
are run locally by each sensor for four iterations. In
these experiments we have excluded all boundary nodes,





































Fig. 10. Comparison of the weighted centroid and minmax
algorithm, large Gaussian deployment deviation, hexagon lattice
deployment and location-based key pre-distribution.
which allows the results to be interpreted as the ex-
pected performance in an infinitely large deployment
field. The comparison results can be summarized as
follows: (1) when the sensing/communication radius
is small, MinMax out perform WTC in both sensing
coverage and the average number of secure links; (2) as
the sensing/communication radius becomes moderately
large, WTC outperforms MinMax in both performance
categories; (3) when the sensing/communication radius
becomes large enough, the performances of the two
schemes will converge.
These results can be interpreted from resource allo-
cation and optimization perspectives [28]. The minmax
criterion employed by the MinMax algorithm empha-
sizes fairness, i.e., even when a point in Voronoi cell
is very far away from the current sensor location, the
location adjusting algorithm tries to cover that point.
In contrast, the criterion employed by WTC emphasizes
efficiency. It tries to minimize the weighted square dis-
tance from the sensor node to all points in its Voronoi
cell, which is a more greedy philosophy compared to
the minmax criterion. In sensor networks, the sensing
and communication range are valuable resources to be
allocated to the deployment field. The results shown
in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 indicate that, with a resources-
scarce situation (relative to the resource needed for
a full coverage/connectivity), the MinMax is a bet-
ter criterion, with a moderate enough amount of re-
sources, WTC outperforms MinMax. To quantify the
demarcation for resource-scarce and resource-abundant
situations, we note that in the ideal hexagon lattice,





27 ≈ 0.62 to achieve full coverage,
and the normalized communication radius needs to be




3 ≈ 1.07 to achieve full
connectivity with the neighbors, which is a pre-requisite
for establishing secure links. As shown in Fig. 9 and
Fig. 10, usually the proposed WTC outperforms the
MinMax algorithm when the normalized sensing and
communication radius are beyond their respective thresh-
olds of 0.62 and 1.07. In practical situations, since the
resource budgets are known prior to the design of sensor
networks, dynamically determining which criterion to
use will best serve the purpose of improving sensing
coverage and establishing secure links.
In a separate experiment, we simulated the WTC
and MinMax algorithms under random deployment with
uniform distribution over the entire field. We place a
total of 49 sensors into a 60 × 60 area and use the
basic key pre-distribution scheme for establishing se-
cure links. In this experiment, as it is not possible to
exclude the boundary nodes in calculating the average
node degree, the average number of secure links drops
significantly when compared to the previous lattice-based
experiments. In spite of the change in accounting the
performance, the simulation results presented in Fig. 11
shows the same trend as Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 in that,
the WTC algorithm achieves better performances in
both performance categories in the resource-abundant
situations, and performs worse than the MinMax in the
resource-scarce situations.
3) Implementation Issues: In the WTC algorithm, the
grid points are chosen to discretize the computation of
the centroid instead of using a continuous integration
over the Voronoi cell. As power consumption is a major
concern in sensor networks, the grid points can be chosen
as sparse or dense according to the power budget, thus
trading off computation accuracy with energy. If the only
goal of location adjustment is to maximize the coverage,
the same weight can be assigned to all wi’s, i.e., wi = 1
for all points.












coverage ratio under uniform random deployment
WTC, basic key pre−distribution
MinMax, basic key pre−distribution















average number of secure links, uniform random deployment
WTC, basic key pre−distribution
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Fig. 11. Comparison of the weighted centroid and minmax algo-
rithm, uniform random deployment with basic key pre-distribution.
Unlike the VFSec algorithm, the WTC is more suit-
able to be performed by individual sensors. This is be-
cause computing both the Voronoi cell and the weighted
centroid can be done locally. The simulation results have
shown that the locally computed location updates using
WTC and MinMax can outperform the location updates
run by a cluster head using the VFA and VFSec. How-
ever, performing Voronoi-cell based scheme generally
requires more computation than the schemes based on
virtual force, which is due to the added dimensionality
in computing the updated locations.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the impact of sensor
deployment on the performance of sensing coverage and
secure connectivity. For static sensor deployment, we
have investigated the hexagon and square lattice topol-
ogy and compared them with the random deployment.
We show that the two lattice topology exhibits range-
dependent performance and there is no all-time winner in
the context of secure connectivity. For designing secure
sensor networks, the system parameters, such as sensing
and communication range, should be jointly considered
with the deployment topology.
When sensor locations can be adjusted after the initial
deployment, to jointly optimize sensing covering and
secure connectivity, we have proposed two sensor lo-
cation updating algorithms, the VFSec and the WTC
algorithm. The simulation results show that the WTC
algorithm outperforms the existing algorithms in both
performance categories under moderate to abundant node
density, while VFSec achieves a superior tradeoff in both
performance categories than the existing virtual force
based algorithms.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix, we analyze the link compromise
probability in the location-based key pre-distribution
scheme in [6] and compare it with that of the basic
scheme [13]. This supports the results presented in
Section III-A.
Let us denote the size of the key pool in the basic
scheme by P , and there are x nodes compromised. For
a given link e in the basic scheme, it has been shown
in [13] that the probability that the link e is compromised
is
Pbasic = Pr(e|x) = 1 − (1 − m
P
)x.
Next, we consider in the group-based scheme [6], the
size of the group key pool is S and the number of sensor
groups is N . We require the total number of distinct
keys in the group based scheme to be the same as in the
basic scheme. As each distinct key appears in exactly two
group key pools, we have P = (NS)/2. In the group-
based scheme, suppose the given link e uses key Ke. This
key Ke is in the key pools of exactly two groups, denoted
by G1 and G2. Only when a compromised node n
(c) is
from one of the two groups, the link e can potentially be
compromised by n(c). When the compromised nodes are
i.i.d. uniformly distributed among all groups, denoting
the probability that a compromised node n(c) falls into
group G1 or G2 by p, we have
p = Pr(n(c) ∈ {G1 ∪ G2}) = 2/N.
In the group-based scheme, the probability that link e is





Pr(e|(k out of x) ∈ {G1 ∪ G2}) ·












For function f(ε) = (1 − ε)a with ε ≈ 0, the first-
order approximation at ε = 0 using Taylor expansion is
f(ε) ≈ 1 − aε. As the key pool size P and the group
key pool size S are much larger than the key ring size
m, both mP and
m
S are close to zero, we can apply first-
order approximation to both (1 − mS )k ≈ 1 − mS k and
(1 − mP )x ≈ 1 − mP x. Thus we arrive at
Pbasic ≈ 1 − (1 − x · m
P















Since we have S = 2P/N and p = 2/N , substituting
these into Eqn. (9), we obtain
Pgroup ≈ x · m
P
≈ Pbasic.
This shows that the link compromise probability of the
basic scheme and the group-based scheme are approxi-
mately the same with the fixed key ring size m.
